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Abstract 
 
This article provides a critical perspective on the performativity of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. It showed that this hypothesis is a fiction that created a 
hyper-reality rather than performed financial markets. Its use by practitioners, 
particularly courts and judges in the United States, has created a dialogue of 
deaf and has generated a gap between the observation of real financial markets 
and the reality practitioners and academics observe from this fiction. This gap 
has created and fuelled several misunderstandings discussed in this article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article provides a critical perspective on the performativity of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) by studying its use by practitioners, particularly courts 
and judges in the United States; then it analyses the dialogue of deaf this use 
has created. EMH was formulated in the period from 1959 to 1976 to give a 
theoretical explanation to the random character of stock market prices. The EMH 
was proposed on the intuition that a pure random-walk model would verify two 
properties of competitive economic equilibrium: the absence of marginal profit 
and the equalisation of a stock’s price and value. Thus, its initial formulation 
suggested that stock prices fully reflect all available information, and that, 
consequently, the actual price of a security is equal to its intrinsic value. In 
addition, because new information is supposed to arrive randomly, stock prices 
fluctuate randomly. EMH laid down one of the cornerstones of financial 
economics and the importance of the pure random-walk model and the Gaussian 
distribution (Poitras 2006, Poitras and Jovanovic 2007, 2010, Rubinstein 1975, 
Sewell 2011): validating the random nature of stock-market variations would, in 
effect, establish that prices on competitive financial markets are in permanent 
equilibrium as a result of the effects of competition (Jovanovic 2008). This is what 
the EMH should be: the random character of stock market variations would 
demonstrate that the prices reflect the competitive equilibrium by incorporating 
the available information. 
 
In 1996, two economists, Houthakker and Williamson, tested the random 
character of stock prices during three periods: January 1969 to June 1975; July 
1975 to June 1982; July 1982 to June 1992. They concluded that “the stock 
market, as measured by the S&P500, did not follow a random walk during the 
first two periods but did so in the third period. In other words, the market became 
more efficient over years” (Houthakker and Williamson 1996, 136). They added, 
“it is somewhat ironic that in the 1970s, when the EMH gained widespread 
acceptance, there were significant departures from a random walk. Fortunately 
for financial theory –and for the functioning of our capital markets– the market 
now conforms closely to a random walk. Reality has caught up with theory”. In a 
certain way, which will be clarified thereafter, these authors provide a telling 
example on how financial economics, and particularly EMH, has not merely 
described or explained but also actively shaped financial markets and practices. 
This is precisely the way performativity is most commonly understood (Boldyrev 
and Svetlova 2016). 
 
The performativity of financial economics has been well analysed and 
documented (Boldyrev and Svetlova 2016, MacKenzie 2006, MacKenzie, 
Muniesa, and Siu 2007, MacKenzie and Millo 2003, Mason, Kjellberg, and 
Hagberg 2015). Following the perspective opened by this literature, this article 
argues that EMH leads to the creation of a fiction, and by trying to shape the real 
financial markets from this fiction, practitioners and academics have generated a 
gap between the observation of real financial markets and the reality they 
observe from this fiction. This gap has increased, creating and fuelling several 
misunderstandings between on the one hand financial economists and on the 
other hand academics and practitioners trained in other fields, like lawyers1. 
Moreover, from Le Gall (2008), Gordon (2013) and Schinckus (2016), this article 
sheds some lights on these misunderstandings by discussing the “financial 
reality” created by financial economists from EMH, suggesting that beyond the 
possible performativity of EMH, these misunderstandings can reflect the 
coexistence of several realities or a hyper-reality which is “the generation by 
models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 1994, 1). 
 
 
I. The creation of performative fiction 
 
Efficient market is a very well known term in finance, widely used by academics 
and practitioners. EMH constitutes one of the major theoretical foundations of the 
financial economics’ framework (Fama 1991, Jovanovic 2010, Jovanovic and 
Schinckus 2016, Malkiel 1992, Poitras 2009, Zuckerman 2013). In 2013, the 
“Nobel Prize in economics” was awarded to Eugene Fama, mainly for his work 
related to this hypothesis:  
 
“In the 1960s, Eugene Fama demonstrated that stock price movements 
are impossible to predict in the short-term and that new information affects 
prices almost immediately, which means that the market is efficient. The 
impact of Eugene Fama's, results has extended beyond the field of 
                                            
1 We could also mention econophysicists for instance (Schinckus 2016, 7). 
research. For example, his results influenced the development of index 
funds” (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2013/fama-facts.html).  
 
Despite this claim, we must clarify Fama’s contribution. Given that several 
authors demonstrated the unpredictability of stock price movements before the 
1960s (Jovanovic and Le Gall 2001, Jovanovic 2009, 2010, Poitras and 
Jovanovic 2007, Sewell 2011), Fama’s major contribution concerns the 
introduction of the term of “efficient market” and the affirmation according to 
which “new information affects prices almost immediately” (Jovanovic 2010, 
2008). EMH has largely shaped financial markets and practices. Among the 
telling examples, we can mention its use for implementing the computerization of 
financial markets (Schinckus 2008), the international standardization of 
accounting conventions (Chane-Alune 2006, Miburn 2008), the legal policies in 
U.S. (Fischel 1989a, Hammer and Groeber 2007, Jovanovic et al. 2015, 
Langevoort 2009) or the financial regulation policies (Muniesa 2003, Pardo-
Guerra 2015); EMH has also changed trading practices (MacKenzie 2006, 
Schinckus 2016), particularly the equities managed by institutional investors like 
exchange-traded fund2. Given the influence of this hypothesis on real financial 
markets and practices, we could view this hypothesis as a telling example of 
performativity (Brisset 2016, MacKenzie 2006). 
 
While, the performativity of this hypothesis seems obvious, it is, in a certain way, 
highly paradoxical. Indeed, the EMH is hardly testable because any empirical test 
of this hypothesis refers to what it is called in the literature, a joint-test. A joint-
test refers to the fact that, on a given market, any test of the efficiency (i.e. the 
fact prices fully reflect available information) tests at the same time the notion of 
efficiency and the asset-pricing model used to price securities on this market. In 
other words, any empirical refutation (or validation) can be due either to the fact 
that the market is not efficient (or efficient) or that the model used is not 
appropriate (or appropriate) for the test. In other words, such a joint-test implies 
that market efficiency per se is not testable (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 
Cuthbertson 2004, Fama 1976, Jovanovic 2010, LeRoy 1976, 1989, Lo 2000). 
Consequently, the observation on a financial market of the random character of 
stock price or return (i.e. are impossible to predict) does not guaranty that the 
EMH is validated (Cornell 2013, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 1989, De Meyer 
and Moussa Saley 2003, Longin 1996)3. This result is supported by another 
major drawback of this hypothesis: the demonstration between the EMH and the 
main stochastic process (martingale), provided by Fama (1970) is tautological 
and questionable (LeRoy 1976, 1989). 
 
Despite this paradoxical situation, EMH has kept a strong influence among 
financial economists, and the whole financial economics mainstream is based on 
                                            
2 An exchange-traded fund is an investment fund trades on financial markets and that tracks an 
index. 
3 It is also true for the other methods used for testing EMH. 
this hypothesis (CAPM, Black and Scholes option pricing model, Harrison-Kreps-
Pliska theoretical framework, etc.). This scientific survival is certainly not 
estranged from the methodological foundations of this hypothesis. The latter is 
based on Milton Friedman’s positivism according to which the realism of the 
hypotheses has no relevance in judging the validity of a model because its 
predictions are all that really matters (Crotty 2013, Frankfurter and McGoun 
1996, 1999, Friedman 1953, Findlay and Williams 2001). In the case of EMH, the 
predictions are the consequence of a competitive market, such as the no-
arbitrage opportunity or the no-profit opportunity. Consequently, EMH does not 
pretend to provide a description of real markets. However, focusing on the 
predictions and the empirical tests, the lack of realism of this hypothesis has 
created the proliferation of definitions leading to the lack of a consensual 
meaning of this hypothesis. For instance, according to Fama (1970, 383) “a 
market in which prices always "fully reflect" available information is called 
"efficient"”; on the other hand, Fama et al. (1969) defined an efficient market as 
“a market that adjusts rapidly to new information”; Jensen (1978) considered that 
“a market is efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make 
economic profit by trading on the basis of information set θt”; according to Malkiel 
(1992) “the market is said to be efficient with respect to some information set […] 
if security prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all 
participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set […] implies 
that it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of [that 
information set]”; Malkiel (2003) stated that efficient financial markets “do not 
allow investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above-average 
risks”. Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981) associated the 
efficiency with the arbitrage-free. These definitions are clearly different. Given the 
lack of consensual definition of what efficient financial markets are, nobody 
knows what an efficient market should be! Only a consensus can be found on its 
possible consequences, such as the no-profit, no-arbitrage opportunity, or the 
no-predictability.  
 
To sum up, EMH is a fiction and not a description of real financial markets. This 
fiction was built from what a financial competitive market should be in order to 
mimic the idealistic framework of economics. This fiction has performed financial 
markets thanks to the implementation of some of its logical consequences in 
regulations, conventions, computerization and practices. However, because this 
hypothesis cannot be tested per se, we cannot provide a quantitative measure of 
the efficiency of a financial market, as Houthakker and Williamson (1996) 
suggested4. Consequently, this performativity seems to be evaluated only 
through the way new regulations, computerisation rules, or laws are 
implemented. Fraud on the Market Doctrine (FoMD), also called Fraud on the 
Market Theory, is one telling example of such performativity due to the fact that 
                                            
4 We could argue that if we define the efficiency as the no-arbitrage opportunity, as Harrison and 
Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981), we could estimate the efficiency on foreign 
exchange markets for instance. Such exceptions are rare and supposed to use a definition of 
EMH different from that of Fama’s and that does not refer to the information. 
U.S. courts have used EMH for creating a new jurisprudence about this doctrine. 
The next part details and discusses this point. 
 
 
II. Some consequences of the use of EMH fiction by U.S. courts 
 
EMH has played a key role in Fraud on the Market U.S. Doctrine by changing its 
interpretation and its scope. The legal roots of this doctrine can be traced back to 
the first attempts to safeguard financial markets as well as the interests of 
investors from fraud and manipulation after the 1929 stock market crash. Initially, 
this doctrine required plaintiffs (i.e. investors) to provide evidence of an 
intentional misstatement or omission of a material fact on which they had relied 
and which had been the proximate cause of their injury. Since 1980 U.S. courts 
have used the EMH for changing the FoMD in order to open the door to class 
action lawsuits (Gordon 2013, Jovanovic et al. 2015). A securities fraud case will 
therefore typically involve a debate around whether or not the market in which 
the securities were traded, was efficient, with the plaintiffs (investors) trying to 
demonstrate this efficiency and the defendants (generally officers of the 
company) trying to disprove it. U.S. courts referred directly to the EMH to justify 
the introduction of this presumption in the court system in order to strengthen the 
case for class actions in securities fraud litigation. In this perspective, the EMH is 
used for demonstrating that every fraudulent misrepresentation was necessarily 
reflected in stock prices, and that every investor could rely solely on those prices 
for transacting. Courts were therefore justified in relinquishing the requirement of 
direct reliance on the alleged misrepresentation whenever public information 
could have an automatic influence on prices.  
 
In their demonstration, U.S. courts radically changed the interpretation of the 
FoMD thanks to the EMH definition introduced by Fama (1970). However, by 
using Fama’s definition, they seemed to (voluntarily) ignore or underestimate the 
fact that market efficiency per se is not testable, has a polymorphous definition, is 
a fiction, and doesn’t designate real financial markets. As Gordon (2013, 10) 
explained “when the law is using a hypothesis to settle a fact, that may be one 
indication that we are in the presence of a fiction”. “The fiction here is that its 
version of the fraud-on-the-market theory pivots on the Court's belief that the 
efficient-market hypothesis not only reflects reality but that there was general 
agreement at the time that this was so” (Gordon 2013, 8). It is worth mentioning 
that, according to this author, some Judges and courts were aware that market 
efficiency is a fiction. However, they probably underestimated all of the 
consequences of such a performativity based on a fiction when they had to 
analyse a real fraud. However, it is worth mentioning that there is a sole 
interpretation among courts and judges. As Jovanovic et al. (2015) explained, 
considering the impossible validation of the EMH, several courts used a less 
literal definition of efficiency stipulating that prices must reflect “most” (and not 
“fully” reflect “all”) public information as Fama (1970) claimed. For instance in 
PolyMedica (2004 and 2005), the court considered that an efficient market 
“is simply one in which ‘most publicly announced material statements about 
companies’ affect stock market prices”. In response to this definition of market 
efficiency, the defendant appealed, alleging an error of law arising from the use 
of “most” in the definition of efficiency, instead of “all” and “fully” (Jovanovic et al. 
2015, 185). The practical difficulties inherited from market efficiency definition led 
the Supreme Court of U.S. to take position for a second time about the FoMD in 
June 2014. Indeed, while this definition using “most” is easier to satisfy, it opened 
the door to criticisms according to which lawyers were said to have initiated class 
action suits as soon as they saw a significant drop in the stock price of a 
company, and it is only afterwards that they are looking for evidence of fraud 
(Erdlen 2011, 897). In 1995, the Congress responded to these criticisms by 
adopting a major reform of securities law that was expressly aimed at holding 
back class action suits (Oldham 2003). This reform did not stop the controversy, 
and harsh debates still continued between the district courts, the Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court about the definition of market efficiency. The last 
judgement of the Supreme Court of U.S. shows that “Securities class actions are 
here to stay” (insidecounsel.com – September 2014, 11), recognizing the legal 
reality created by the use of the EMH inherited from Fama (1970) (Jovanovic et 
al. 2015). 
 
It is worth analysing the controversy between “most” and “all/fully”. This 
controversy reveals that U.S. courts refer to two realities although they did not 
mention it: the use of the term “most” directly refers to the real financial markets 
while the use of terms “all” and “fully” are directly related to the EMH fiction5. 
Indeed, the definition using the term “most” is crafted for the practical legal 
purpose guarantying the applicability of the FoMD (Jovanovic et al. 2015). In this 
case, courts interpret real financial markets. By opposition, the definition using 
the terms “full” and “all”, courts interpret a fiction. Indeed, as explained, the 
observation of a full reflection of all available information does not exist in real 
financial markets. This no-existence is at least the logical consequence of the 
lack of demonstration between EMH definition stated by Fama (1970) and the 
hypotheses that are really tested (no-profit, arbitrage free, etc.). In other terms, 
the paradoxical situation pointed out in the first part has led to a deaf dialogue 
between the U.S. courts because they based their demonstrations and 
interpretations on two incompatible realities. 
 
This result calls for a new look on the performativity of EMH6. Remember that the 
performativity supposes to have access to the real financial markets, because 
performativity implies that EMH actively shapes the real markets. Discussing the 
computerization of financial markets, Schinckus (2016) suggests that while the 
                                            
5 The controversy between “most” and “all/fully” is not the only one created by the use of EMH. 
Jurists introduced for instance a dual definition of market efficiency depending on the importance 
given to the notion of fundamental value, leading to distinguish between a “trading-rule efficiency” 
and a “value efficiency” (Fischel 1989b, 912-13). 
6 See also the position defended by Zuckerman (2013) about the performativity of EMH. 
relation between EMH and real financial market does not exist, a relation exists 
between the EMH and a hyper-reality created from this hypothesis:  
 
“Computerization of the financial sphere is based on an a priori 
representation (the efficient-market hypothesis) that does not exist outside 
our textbooks […]. This hyper-reality enhanced by the computerization of 
financial markets does not result from potential reality (efficient market do 
not exist), but paradoxically shapes reality” (Schinckus 2016, 5). 
 
Following this point, the EMH hyper-reality has replaced the real financial 
markets, which are not accessible anymore. In this perspective, this hyper-reality 
is not plainly compatible with the idea of performativity because it is not the real 
financial markets that are shaped. Considering our previous discussion, by using 
“fully/all” to define the efficiency, efficient market becomes a hyper-reality for 
courts (i.e. an imaginary projection of what is a market) from which they extended 
the FoMD. Judging the “real” markets from this “imaginary construction of 
financial markets” (Schinckus 2016, 7) could appear paradoxical, but it is not! 
Given that efficient market hypothesis is used in order to open a class action 
lawsuit, showing statistical data proving that stock prices or returns are 
stochastic, is supposed to validate the EMH7, and to prove the market efficiency 
for the tenants of the EMH hyper-reality. Doing this is generally enough to find a 
deal between the two parts and then to stop the lawsuit without making a real 
demonstration that markets are efficient. Therefore, a real confrontation with real 
financial markets never occurs. In other term, the FoMD extended with EMH has 
allowed the existence of two realities and the maintenance of the deaf dialogue 
previously pointed out.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This article showed that EMH is a fiction that created a hyper-reality rather than 
performed financial markets. The fact that some courts interpret a fiction and 
other courts interpret the real markets has some practical implications. According 
to the definition of EMH and then the reality (i.e. real markets or hyper-reality) in 
which the courts will base their interpretations, we can have more or less class 
action lawsuits: if we interpret the reality (“most”) we will increase number of 
class action lawsuits, by opposition if we interpret the hyper-reality (“full/all”) we 
will decrease number of class action lawsuits. 
 
  
                                            
7 We have the same result if we use any other statistical tests that validate one of the three forms 
of the EMH. 
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